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IRAQI WOMEN AS LEGALLY VULNERABLE SUBJECTS:
APPLYING GENDER-MAINSTREAMING AND
VULNERABILITY THEORY IN THE POST-CONFLICT
IRAQI STATE
ABSTRACT
As the United States mobilized troops to invade Iraq in the spring of 2003,
the national agenda at the forefront of the charge was “Operation Iraqi
Freedom.” The push to “liberate” the Iraqi citizen from the oppressive Ba’athist
State capitalized on a newly created United Nations Security Council
Resolution: Resolution 1325. As a peace-building mechanism, Resolution 1325
proposes that in order to reconstruct a nation following conflict, increased
numbers of women must be incorporated into policy, government, and police
forces. This form of gender mainstreaming is a tenet of liberal feminism that
relies on the “add women and stir” approach to gendered equality. However,
when applied in post-conflict Iraq, women did not experience the expected
gendered equality envisioned by Resolution 1325. Instead, these reconstruction
techniques ignored the crumbling state infrastructure and attempted to impose
western ideals of equality, leaving Iraqi women only more vulnerable and
susceptible to gender based violence and retaliation, disease, poverty, and
death. This Comment argues that in post-conflict Iraq, Resolution 1325 was not
only apathetically applied, but was, and remains to be, a wholly ineffective tool
to reconstruct war-torn nations. This Comment therefore proposes an
alternative to the gender-mainstreaming policies of Resolution 1325, turning
instead to Martha Fineman’s Vulnerability Theory. Rather than attempting to
achieve gendered justice by increasing the numbers of women in reconstruction,
Vulnerability Theory operates within the post-conflict state to assert that the
state must be responsive to the root causes of suffering and discrimination
experienced by vulnerable populations following armed conflict, and must
rebuild base economic, political, and social infrastructure first, understanding
that factors such as poverty, diminished access to life-saving resources,
unemployment and insecurity all intersect with gender to perpetuate conditions
of vulnerability, suffering, and violence.
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INTRODUCTION
The year was 2005, two years following the U.S. invasion of Iraq, when Dr.
Zeena Al-Qushtaini was abducted from her workplace by six armed gunmen.1
Ten days following her abduction, Zeena’s body appeared on the side of a
highway, a few miles south of Baghdad, Iraq.2
Known to her friends and colleagues as “Lady Zeena,” Dr. Al-Qushtaini was
a women’s activist, divorcee, business partner, and single mother with a fulltime job at a local pharmacy.3 According to friends, Dr. Al-Qushtaini always
wore the “latest fashion,” preferring Western clothing, manicured nails, and
highlights over traditional, cultural dress.4 However, when her body was
discovered, Dr. Al-Qushtaini’s blue jeans were replaced by a long black gown
known as an abaya, and her highlighted hair was concealed under a headscarf.5
Her body was displayed as a warning by extremists to any and all women who
attempted to subvert traditional culture and religion. The note pinned to her chest
claimed “[s]he was a collaborator against Islam.”6
Dr. Al-Qushtaini’s story does not stand alone. Her name joined a long list of
Iraqi women activists violently targeted and silenced since the U.S. invasion in
2003.7 Ongoing gender-based violence experienced by Iraqi women exists as a

1
Eve Conant, Iraq’s Hidden War, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 6, 2005, 7:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/
iraqs-hidden-war-114807.
2
Marjorie P. Lasky, Iraqi Women Under Siege, REPORT (CODEPINK: Women for Peace, Venice, C.A.
& Global Exchange, San Francisco, C.A.), Apr. 2006, at 8.
3
Conant, supra note 1; Windows of Opportunity: Pursuit of Gender Equality in Post-War Iraq, BRIEFING
PAPER (Women for Women Int’l, Washington, D.C.), Jan. 2005, at 6.
4
Id.; BARRY RUBIN, THE MIDDLE EAST: A GUIDE TO POLITICS, ECONOMICS, SOCIETY AND CULTURE 627
(2015).
5
Windows of Opportunity: The Pursuit of Gender Equality in Post-War Iraq, supra note 3.
6
Lasky, supra note 2, at 9.
7
Windows of Opportunity: The Pursuit of Gender Equality in Post-War Iraq, supra note 3. This list
includes countless other powerful women such as Salwa (Program Assistant, Coalition Provisional Authority,
helped establish women’s centers in the southern governorates, murdered), Majida (member of Sadr City District
Advisory Council (DAC), kidnapped and killed), Rwaida (translator for U.S. officials, murdered), Huda
(Outreach Department Manager, International Internet Network, killed on the way home from work), Liqa’a
(staff member of Iraq’s Al Sharqya TV, shot to death), Aamal (consultant in an Iraqi ministry, shot and killed
with two of her bodyguards), Wijdan (businesswoman, activist, and candidate for January 2005 elections,
murdered). Id.
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daily reality, as Layla A., an Iraqi woman working in an international
humanitarian relief agency, relates:8
Women are afraid of raising their voices because of fear . . . . Women
are targeted . . . . Women are threatened . . . . Women are being
attacked and killed . . . . Death is an everyday occurrence.9

Predating the U.S. occupation, Iraq provided more rights and freedoms for
women and girls than most of its neighboring nations.10 Although the Ba’athist
regime and economic sanctions impacted various areas of the woman’s position
in the state, Iraqi women were active participants in society before the
occupation.11 Beginning in the 1970s, Saddam Hussein built a strong base of
Sunni supporters by introducing a number of progressive policies that extended
women’s rights, free access to education and other social benefits.12 Following
the lifting of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries oil embargo,
Iraq experienced an unprecedented boom and rapidly developed due to a steep
rise in global oil prices.13 The newly flourishing economy, therefore, ensured
that most of the Iraqi population enjoyed high living standards.14 In the face of
economic prosperity and the expansion of the Iraqi middle class, the state turned
its attention towards social advancement, most notably the advancement of Iraqi
women by eradicating illiteracy and incorporating them into the labor force.15
Thus, beginning in the mid-1970s, the Iraqi government began taking steps
toward an educated class of Iraqi women.16 Under the Ba’athist state, the family
unit created the foundation of modern citizenship in which the state’s
“developmental and modernizing social policies targeted the family by issuing
legislation that provided the legal underpinnings for women’s autonomy[.]”17
The Ba’athist state subsequently adopted the role of protector to mothers and

8
NADJE AL-ALI & NICOLA PRATT, WHAT KIND OF LIBERATION? WOMEN AND THE OCCUPATION OF IRAQ
77 (2009).
9
Id. (emphasis added).
10
Lasky, supra note 2, at 2.
11
Id.
12
Michael Massing, The Moral Quandary: Anti-Imperialism vs. Humanitarianism, THE NATION, Jan. 6,
2003, at 18 (citing Iraqi scholar and feminist Nadje Al-Ali who cautions that while the Ba’athist regime under
Saddam Hussein committed uncountable acts of atrocity that must be recognized and accounted for, the status
of women in his regime present a much more complicated and complex picture).
13
Nadje Al-Ali, Reconstructing Gender: Iraqi Women between Dictatorship, War, Sanctions and
Occupation, 26 THIRD WORLD Q. 739, 744 (2005).
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 744–45.
17
DINA RIZK KHOURY, IRAQ IN WARTIME: SOLDIERING, MARTYRDOM AND REMEMBRANCE 172 (2013).
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children both legally and socially.18 Additionally, in 1974, the Ba’athist
government decreed that all university graduates, including women, would be
guaranteed automatic employment immediately following the conferral of their
degrees.19 Especially in fields of study such as health care, teaching and
education, the Iraqi state required graduates to obtain employment in their
respective professions promptly following graduation.20 The image of
university-educated women working outside the home not only became
commonplace, but it became expected as an integral part of social
advancement.21
The above comparison between the story of Dr. Zeena Al- Qushtaini and the
historical background of Iraqi women in the Ba’athist state clearly details that
something that sparked Iraqi women’s transition from mobile, active members
of society to targets of intense, gender-based violence and vulnerability occurred
between Saddam Hussein’s regime and the status of the Iraqi state today. This
Comment argues that the shift began in 2003 with the U.S. led invasion of Iraq
and the implementation of interventionist policies, specifically gender
mainstreaming via United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325
(Resolution 1325 or the Resolution). This Comment proposes that by attempting
to ameliorate the condition of Iraqi women via gender mainstreaming policies,
the U.S. ignored the crumbling social, political and economic state infrastructure
that deeply impacted the survival of Iraqi women and the impact westernizing
policies would have on Iraqi women, leaving them more vulnerable and
susceptible to gender-based violence.
Therefore, in Part I, this Comment traces the creation of Resolution 1325
and the philosophy of gender mainstreaming that drives the Resolution in
international conflict. Part II subsequently examines why the U.S. turned to
gender mainstreaming policies by tracing U.S. involvement in Iraq and the
rhetoric shift from the search for nuclear weapons to the mission of human rights
protection in order to retain international support for occupation. In Part III, this
Comment argues that the shift to gender mainstreaming policies and rhetoric via
Resolution 1325 had devastating consequences for Iraqi women, rendering them
more vulnerable to gender-based suffering and violence. Part IV, therefore,
argues that gender mainstreaming cannot be used as a one size fits all policy to
18

Id.
Al-Ali, supra note 13.
20
Id. at 744–45.
21
Id. at 745. While political indoctrination was a strong motivation behind the incorporation of women
in the labor force as political party members and leaders were recruited from the workplace, Iraqi women became
among the most educated, literate and professionally qualified in the entire region. See id.
19
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promote gendered rights in areas of international conflict, and instead proposes
that Vulnerability Theory could play a crucial role in post-conflict settings by
leading to policies that would help ameliorate structural sources of gendered
vulnerability without exposing women to heightened gender-based violence.
I.

U.N. RESOLUTION 1325: AN OVERVIEW

A. The Road to Resolution 1325
On October 31, 2000, the United Nations Security Council unanimously
passed Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.22 Resolution 1325
mainstreamed women into post-conflict resolution, peacebuilding and increased
participation in conflict prevention.23 Resolution 1325 is largely viewed as a
momentous breakthrough for women in international relations, and a highly
significant piece of international legislation for women’s rights on the political
grassroots and international stage.24 However, many women in post-conflict
communities, grassroots movements, and political organizations argue that the
gender mainstreaming that motivates such policies render them fundamentally
ineffective when implemented in foreign theaters of conflict.
Both the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights speak
in terms of equal rights for men and women. A special commission, The
Commission on the Status of Women was established to implement this
guarantee.25 In 1995, the Beijing Conference convened and produced the Beijing
Declaration and Platform for Action, which was adopted unanimously by 189
countries and built on political agreements aimed at securing the equality of
women with men in law and in practice.26 Areas of concern addressed in the
declaration included: human rights, violence against women, health, economic
empowerment and special concerns of female children.27 The Declaration
condemned forced abortions, forced sterilizations, female genital mutilation,
dowry burning, and sexual harassment and domestic violence on an international

22
Nicola Pratt & Sophie Richter-Devroe, Critically Examining UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and
Security, 13 INT’L FEMINIST J. POL. 489, 489 (2011).
23
Id. at 493; Al-Ali, supra note 13, at 740.
24
Pratt & Richter-Devroe, supra note 22, at 490; Torunn L. Tryggestad, Trick or Treat? The UN and
Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security, 15 GLOB. GOVERNANCE
539, 539–40 (2009).
25
Elizabeth F. Defeis, The United Nations and Women – A Critique, 17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
395, 397 (2011).
26
Id. at 398.
27
Id. at 398–99.
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scale.28 Inspired by the Beijing Conference, the NGO Working Group on
Women and Armed Conflict lobbied the U.N. for a security council resolution
to address the issue of women in conflict and peace negotiations.29 In response,
Namibia agreed to sponsor a session on Women, Peace and Security. A week
following the session, The United Nations Security Council unanimously passed
Resolution 1325.30
B. The Gender Mainstreaming Approach of Resolution 1325
Resolution 1325 takes a two-pronged approach to gender mainstreaming in
order to address the needs of women affected by armed conflict. The concept of
gender mainstreaming was first introduced within the U.N. system by the
Economic and Social Council in 1997 and defined as follows:
Mainstreaming a gender perspective is the process of assessing the
implication for women and men of any planned action, including
legislation, policies and programmes, in all area and at all levels. It is
a strategy for making women as well as men’s concerns and
experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation,
monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political,
economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally
and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve
gender equality.31

The Resolution first highlights women’s agency as peacemakers and agents
of resolution. Resolution 1325 first demands the inclusion of women in
designing responses to conflict and injects a gender perspective into
humanitarian responses and post-conflict reconstruction. Second, the Resolution
draws focus to women as victims of sexual assault as a weapon of war.32
Therefore, Resolution 1325 is an addition to an already growing body of
U.N. foreign policy that links “the attainment of peace and security with the
achievement of equality between women and men” so that a gender perspective
is present in all post-conflict resolution missions.33 As a piece of international
feminist policy, Resolution 1325 is firmly grounded in liberal feminist and
28

Id.
Tryggestad, supra note 24, at 545.
30
Pratt & Richter-Devroe, supra note 22, at 492.
31
Susan Willett, Introduction: Security Council Resolution 1325: Assessing the Impact on Women, Peace
and Security, 17 INT’L PEACEKEEPING 142, 148 (2010).
32
Fionnuala D. Ní Aoláin, Advancing Women’s Rights in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations, 104 AM.
SOC’Y INT’L L. 568, 569–70 (2010).
33
Hilary Charlesworth, Not Waving but Drowning: Gender Mainstreaming and Human Rights in the
United Nations, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS J. 1, 15 (2005).
29
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equality-based initiatives for peacebuilding. According to feminist theorist
Susan Willett, 1990s feminists throughout the Beijing Conference who were
“committed to gender analysis, and nongovernment women’s groups inspired
by more liberal interpretations of feminism . . . press[ed] for greater awareness
of the gendered inequality in international solutions to conflict.”34 Therefore,
gender mainstreaming became a foundational component initially formulated
within the Beijing Platform in order to achieve gender equality.35
However, feminist scholar Taria Va¨yrynen argues that this dominant liberal
feminist discourse establishing peace through equality inevitably imposes severe
limits on gender mainstreaming in peace and security policies.36 The Resolution
touts giving attention to the specific needs of women and girls post-violence,
supporting grassroots women’s initiatives and protecting the human rights of
women and girls while constructing the building blocks of a new, democratic
society.37 Yet, feminist scholar Hilary Charlesworth criticizes this act of gender
mainstreaming stating, “[i]n this sense, Resolution 1325 presents gender as all
about women and unconnected with masculine identities in times of conflict and
the violent patterns of conduct that are accepted because they are coded as
male.”38 By remaining firmly rooted in masculine identities, international
feminist scholar Susan Willett concurs that “gender mainstreaming in
peacekeeping will consciously be contained at the level of a rhetorical norm,
within a highly masculinized and militarized hierarchy[.]”39
Therefore, Resolution 1325 grafts gender mainstreaming onto existing
hierarchies and gender-based power binaries where men continue to be
portrayed as protectors and policy-makers and women are portrayed as victims
in need of protection.40 Thus, a woman’s active presence in the male dominated
sphere of conflict resolution and peacemaking fills only a “tokenistic [space]”
in the male dominant discourse of militarism and war.41 Indeed, if gender
mainstreaming is to extend beyond the liberal feminist interpretation of equality
via the “add women and stir” method of incorporation, gendered justice cannot
be achieved simply through presence.42 While increasing women’s
34

Willett, supra note 31, at 148.
Amy Barrow, ‘[It’s] Like a Rubber Band.’ Assessing UNSCR 1325 as a Gender Mainstreaming
Process, INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 51, 51 (2009).
36
Willett, supra note 31, at 150.
37
Charlesworth, supra note 33, at 15.
38
Id.
39
Willett, supra note 31, at 143.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 144.
42
Barrow, supra note 35, at 60.
35
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representation in nation building, peace keeping and reconstruction implies the
achievement of equality, if women’s unique voices, positions and experiences
are not articulated and addressed, equality is only achieved symbolically.43
According to feminist scholar Amy Barrow, the implementation of
Resolution 1325 in Afghanistan via the construction of humanitarian aid
agencies for women ultimately failed by promoting “add women and stir” over
the unique voices and experiences of Afghani women.44 Many openly supported
the few benefits of a limited health care provision for women over such political
statements because by creating more expansive health care for women in relation
to Resolution 1325, such a policy could promote women’s access to health.45
However, on the flip side, taking a stance and highlighting the women’s plight
may provoke retaliation by Taliban forces, putting women at greater risk.46
Therefore by ignoring the social realities of women in the social, political,
economic and environmental context of armed conflict, gender mainstreaming
instead endangered more women than it assisted.
Similarly, gender mainstreaming policy initiatives left women far more
vulnerable in Iraqi communities during and following the U.S. invasion of Iraq.
In order to examine the consequences of gender mainstreaming policies in Iraq,
this Comment will trace U.S. involvement in Iraq from the beginning rhetoric
justifying U.S. intervention, to the shift towards rights-based intervention

43
Id. at 54–55. Since its implementation, Resolution 1325 has been used in a multitude of conflict and
post-conflict situations with moderating degrees of success. See Pratt & Richter-Devroe, supra note 22, at 497.
In Serbia, Resolution 1325 is used by the feminist network, Women in Black, to break with traditional militarism
of post conflict resolution. Id. This interpretation of resolution is “not mirrored in the governmental Serbian
National Action Plan nor in the agenda of the UNDP’s South-Eastern European Arms Clearinghouse.” Id. In
Palestine, Grassroots women’s organizations are finding Resolution 1325 marginally useful in their work on
women’s security and empowerment, but structural conflict between Israel and Palestine is so pervasive that
Resolution 1325 cannot compensate for the tension, or yield tangible results. Id. Conversely, Resolution 1325
has yielded tangible results in Nepal, however grassroots women’s organizations argue that the “women, peace
and security” delegitimizes women’s agency because the focus is on the armed conflict, not on the structural
inequalities and violence that most strongly impact women’s agency including rape, trafficking, and gendered
attacks. Id.
44
Barrow, supra note 35, at 59.
45
Id.
46
Id.
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policies and the implementation of gender mainstreaming policies under
Resolution 1325.
II. U.S. RHETORIC SHIFTS THROUGH INVASION AND
INTERNATIONAL EMBARRASSMENT
A. Early Rhetoric and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Justification for the U.S.’ invasion of Iraq did not initially rest on gender
mainstreaming rhetoric. Instead, as early as January 2002, speculation stirred in
the international community surrounding an impending U.S. invasion of Iraq in
order to disarm the country and prevent any further development of weapons of
mass destruction (WMDs).47 On November 8, 2002, the U.N. Security Council
adopted Resolution 1441 stating that not only was Iraq in violation of past
resolutions, but also requiring immediate compliance with disarmament
directives.48 Additionally, the Resolution required Iraq to allow “immediate,
unimpeded, unconditional and unrestricted access” to U.N.-appointed inspectors
as they searched “facilities, buildings, equipment, records, and means of
transport which they wish[ed] to inspect” for WMDs.49 The Resolution also
contained a thinly veiled threat: Iraq would face “serious consequences” if it did
not comply with the Resolution or demands to disarm.50
Pursuant to Resolution 1441, the U.N. deployed weapons inspectors to the
country to ensure compliance from November 27, 2002 through March 18,
2003.51 In the midst of heightening hostilities, President George W. Bush stood
before Congress for his State of the Union address on January 28, 2003 and
declared, “[Hussein] pursued chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, even
while inspectors were in his country. . . .Year after year, Saddam Hussein has
gone to elaborate lengths, spent enormous sums, taken great risks to build and
keep weapons of mass destruction.”52 On February 5, 2003, Secretary of State
Colin Powell briefed the U.N. Security Council once more, declaring that Iraq
continued to be noncompliant in the disarmament and inspection process.53 At
47
Daryll Kimball, Disarming Saddam — A Chronology of Iraq and UN Weapons Inspections from 20022003, ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/iraqchron (last updated July
2003).
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
George W. Bush, President U.S., State of the Union Address in Washington, D.C (Jan. 28, 2003)
(transcript available at http://whitehouse.georgewbush.org/news/2003/012803-SOTU.asp).
53
Kimball, supra note 47.
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this briefing, the first allegation was made that not only was Iraq refusing to
cooperate, it was actively concealing weapons of mass destruction.54 Therefore,
by the end of February, the U.S. was primed for war. The U.S. subsequently
imposed a March 17, 2003 deadline for all disarmament activities, despite
cautions from France, China, and Russia who remained suspicious that Iraq
possessed weapons of mass destruction and urged that a military invasion should
be a “last resort.”55 Despite these warnings, by March 19, 2003, the U.S. had
boots on the ground, and the invasion of Iraq commenced.56
Evidence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq quickly deteriorated in light
of day to be nothing more than a “smoking gun.”57 By the beginning of May
2003, almost two months following U.S. invasion, the Bush Administration
officially declared that no weapons of mass destruction were found in Iraq.58 A
Senate Intelligence Committee report in 2004 publicly confirmed that the
suspicion of the presence and production of WMDs in Iraq was a
“mischaracterization of the intelligence.”59 In response, the national image, both
at home and in the international community plummeted, leaving the proverbial
egg fixed firmly to the face of the nation.
B. A Shifting Rhetoric: From Weapons to Women
Therefore, the failure to discover WMDs and the rapidly declining approval
of the U.S. led invasions left the U.S. scrambling to find a new rhetoric that
would justify the military assault on Iraq and garner support both at home and
abroad. The U.S. subsequently turned towards liberationist policies, such as
gender mainstreaming through Resolution 1325, in order to implement the
rhetoric of building a revitalized and democratic Iraq.60 On an aircraft carrier
dubbed the Abraham Lincoln, President Bush delivered an address, later titled
the “Mission Accomplished” speech,61 that reflects the shift to more liberationist
rhetoric. He proclaimed that in the midst of “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” the U.S

54

Id.
Id.
56
Id.
57
Shirley V. Scott & Olivia Ambler, Does Legality Really Matter? Accounting for the Decline in US
Foreign Policy Legitimacy Following the 2003 Invasion of Iraq, 13 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 68, 70 (Mar. 2007).
58
Kimball, supra note 47.
59
Scott & Ambler, supra note 57.
60
George W. Bush, President U.S., “Mission Accomplished” Speech to The Abraham Lincoln Carrier
(May 1, 2003) (transcript available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/may/01/usa.iraq).
61
Seth Cline, The Other Symbol of George W. Bush’s Legacy, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (May 1,
2003),
https://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/press-past/2013/05/01/the-other-symbol-of-george-w-bushslegacy.
55
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fought for liberty and peace while freeing and rebuilding a nation.62 President
Bush proclaimed:
[W]e will stand with the new leaders of Iraq as they establish a
government of, by, and for the Iraqi people. The transition from
dictatorship to democracy will take time, but it is worth every effort.
Our coalition will stay until our work is done. Then we will leave, and
we will leave behind a free Iraq.63

The shift to rights-based rhetoric in order to justify U.S. action and restore
the country’s hero image is not a revolutionary tactic. U.S. legal historian Mary
Dudziak writes that in the nation’s past, domestic civil rights reform was used
as a significant part of the Cold War due to heightened criticism of the U.S. in
the international community.64 As the U.S. took a firm stance against the spread
of communism, rhetoric surrounding good versus evil and the triumph of
freedom dominated the nation’s promotion of global democracy.65 However,
international political powers criticized the fact that American democracy was
touted as the ideal political scheme that made the achievement of social justice
possible;66 yet, domestic racial inequity and segregation persisted.67 Such
hypocrisy, in the eyes of the international community, severely hampered the
insistence of American moral superiority.68 Therefore, the U.S. responded with
burgeoning federal promotion of social change domestically, as an attempt to
improve the American image, both at home and abroad, and to garner support
for the U.S. in the midst of the Cold War.69
Similarly in the case of Iraq, the U.S. faced intense domestic and
international criticism after news emerged that the country invaded a foreign
land without sufficient evidence or support showing the presence of WMDs.70
According to international legal scholars Shirley Scott and Olivia Ambler,
instead of being a show of national strength responding in the wake of the 9/11
terrorist attacks, the invasion subsequently became a symbol of rash decisionmaking, and deception by the Bush Administration.71 Therefore, by adopting the

62

Bush, supra note 60.
Id.
64
MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 11–
12 (2002).
65
Id. at 12.
66
Id. at 13.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 12.
69
Id.
70
Scott & Ambler, supra note 57, at 70.
71
Id. at 70, 84; AL-ALI & PRATT, supra note 8, at 83.
63
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rights-based rhetoric implemented via gender mainstreaming through
Resolution 1325 to address the “plight” of the Iraqi women, Iraqi feminist
scholar Nadje Al-Ali posits that the U.S. once more used the rhetoric of
supporting equal rights and justice in order to save face with the international
community following global embarrassment and criticism.72 Just as the U.S.
turned to domestic rights-based rhetoric to combat international criticism and
maintain support during the Cold War, history repeated itself as the U.S. turned
once again to rights-based rhetoric to maintain political face during an
unsupported invasion into a foreign land.
III. THE ADOPTION AND FAILURE OF GENDER MAINSTREAMING VIA
RESOLUTION 1325
According to Madeline Rees, the current Secretary General of the Women’s
International League for Peace and Freedom, and international lawyer Christine
Chinkin, “there is no U.N. Security Council Resolution more quoted, relied
upon, or used as a rallying cry than U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325.”73
The U.S., therefore, facially adopted the gender mainstreaming policies of
Resolution 1325 in order to publicly advance political rhetoric reflecting a
commitment to human dignity and women’s empowerment. 74
However, realistic implementation of Resolution 1325’s mission statement
to include women in post-conflict resolution and peacekeeping governance, fell
far short of the mark.75 Not only did the U.S. treat gender mainstreaming as a
political afterthought when attempting to rebuild the Iraqi government, but
attempts to fast-track Iraqi women into non-traditional gender roles ignored the
disintegrating economic and environmental infrastructures barring Iraqi women
from basic human resources, and painted Iraqi women as symbols of western

72

AL-ALI & PRATT, supra note 8, at 83.
Madeleine Rees & Christine Chinkin, Exposing the Gendered Myth of Post Conflict Transition: The
Transformative Power of Economic and Social Rights, 48 N.Y.U.J. INT’L L. & POL. 1211, 1215 (2016).
74
Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Sec’y of State, Interview with The Washington Post editorial board in
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occupation. Both actions left Iraqi women intensely more vulnerable to genderbased violence, and anti-occupation retaliation.
A. Injecting Iraqi Women into Politics: An Apathetic Attempt
Early attempts to implement Resolution 1325 and mainstream Iraqi women
into positions of political and social power manifested in the creation of a
National Action Plan (NAP).76 A National Action Plan operates to “outline
strategies, identify priority areas, assign roles, establish timelines, construct
indicators, and determine a means of measurement and evaluation” in the
execution of national policy or reform.77 Under the supervision of U.N.
appointed advisors, the Iraqi National Action Plan model closely mirrors that of
the U.S. by addressing three broad initiatives: “(1) increasing the number of
women in the police, military, judiciary and elected offices; (2) educating
women and girls; (3) increasing women’s employability and job opportunities;
and (4) perfecting laws that disadvantage women or drafting and implementing
laws to promote women’s equality.”78 However, according to a study performed
by the European Peace Building Liaison Office, the implementation of a
National Action Plan requires basic foundational supports to be marginally
successful.79 Most notably, there must be political will on the part of high
ranking government officials, international peer pressure, and accountability.80
However, in Iraq, such a foundation was met with apathy and indifference.
Following official military withdrawal from Iraq, the U.S. established the
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) under the U.S. appointed head, Paul
Bremer, in order to re-establish peace and political stability in post-invasion
Iraq.81 In July 2003, the CPA formed an advisory body comprised of a twentyfive member council representing a balance of different religious and ethnic
sects within the Iraqi state.82 The newly formed advisory committee, the Iraqi
76
Barbara Miller, Milad Pournik & Aisling Swaine, Women in Peace and Security through United
Nations Security Resolution 1325: Literature Review, Content Analysis of National Action Plans, and
Implementation 10 (Institute for Global and International Studies, Working Paper No. 13, 2014).
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Dina Francesca Haynes, Naomi Cahn & Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Women in the Post-Conflict Process:
Reviewing the Impact of Recent U.N. Actions in Achieving Gender Centrality, 11 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 189,
203 (2012).
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Miller et al., supra note 76, at 16–17.
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Id. at 17.
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See generally L. Paul Bremer, James Dobbins & David Gompert, Early Days in Iraq: Decisions of the
CPA, 50 GLOB. POL. & STRATEGY 21 (2008) (citing L. Paul Bremer as Presidential Envoy to Iraq and
Administrator
of the Coalition Provisional Authority).
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Governing Council (IGC), was made up of twelve Shi’i, five Sunnis, five Kurds,
one Turk-men, and one Christian.83 With the use of ethnic and religious quotas
to determine the composition of the IGC, Patricia Hewett, U.K. Secretary of
State for Trade and Industry and Minister for Women, proposed the addition of
a gender quota to channel Resolution 1325 and incorporate Iraqi women into the
nation-building process.84 Yet according to a former U.K. Minister of State,
“[t]he U.S. was skeptical about it. They thought it was a nice idea, but it wasn’t
a priority for them.”85
Illustrating this allegation, Lt. Col. Carl E. Mundy, who played a key role in
managing post-conflict operations in southern Iraq, reported, “‘[w]e didn’t give
special considerations to engaging the women [in the political process] . . . My
concern was not stepping where I shouldn’t step, or dragging a woman in there
that would anger the local men.’”86 Therefore, the U.S. dodged the issue of
implementing Resolution 1325 and incorporating women into the rebuilding and
peacemaking process out of deference for conservative Iraqi sensibilities.
However, as Safia al-Souhail, a leader of the Bani Tamim tribe in central Iraq,
remarked, ‘“[t]hey’re forcing a lot of changes on this society. Why not force this
as well? . . . Suddenly, women’s rights are the red line?”‘87
Thus, despite lobbying by the U.K. government, Iraqi women and the CPA
women’s affairs officer, Judy Van Rest, the CPA only appointed three women
to the IGC, with only one woman in the Cabinet of Ministers.88 In addition to
being fundamentally excluded from the IGC, there were no Iraqi women
appointed to the twenty-four-member constitutional drafting committee that
created the document that currently serves as Iraq’s interim constitution.89 The
failed prioritization of female representation in national peacebuilding and
restructuring demonstrates a clear lack of political will, and the inconsequential
impact of international peer pressure and accountability. While the U.S. adopted
rhetoric that advocated an expansion of Iraqi women’s rights through political
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affirmative action, the lack of effort dedicated to implementing such policies
resulted in nothing more than stagnation for Iraqi women.
B. Rapidly Deteriorating Living Conditions: Water, Electricity, Health Care
and Unemployment
Combined with a lack of effort dedicated to incorporating women into the
peacebuilding process, gender mainstreaming via Resolution 1325 also failed to
address the disintegration of the Iraqi state infrastructure caused by invasion and
sanctions that ravaged the country of vital resources necessary to support the
health and wellbeing of Iraqi women and their families.90 Due to insufficient
clean water and sanitation, few adequate health care services, irregular
electricity, and plummeting employment options in the current economic crisis,
sickness, starvation, poverty, and skyrocketing mortality rates became a living
reality post-invasion.91
Before the invasion, approximately 12.9 million Iraqis had access to safe
drinking water.92 However, only three years following U.S. boots on the ground,
only 9.7 million had access to this basic right.93 As one Baghdadi doctor, Intisar
K., commented: “There is not enough clean drinking water. Lack of sanitation
is a big problem and continues to be one of the main causes of malnutrition,
dysentery and death amongst young children.”94 In 2004, local surveys reported
that the rates of acute malnutrition among young Iraqi children nearly doubled
since the invasion of the country, leaving roughly 400,000 children suffering
from “wasting,” an illness manifested by chronic diarrhea and dangerous protein
deficiencies.95
In the health care sector, infant and mother mortality rates skyrocketed with
significantly diminished intervention by U.S. Forces.96 Although the 2003
World Bank and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) joint
assessment report detailed the desperate need to rebuild the Iraqi healthcare
system, the U.S. allocated less than $1 billion of funding to the health care
sector.97 Progress is reportedly particularly slow in rebuilding primary health
90
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care centers which are crucial for women in rural communities.98 Therefore, as
of 2007, only fifteen of the 142 health centers promised by the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) were built, and those structures left
standing were ravaged by looters as U.S. soldiers looked on.99 Salwa H. a
medical doctor in Iraq100 recalled:
I saw soldiers laughing and encouraging a group of young men who
looted a hospital. They were just standing there and grinning, making
jokes about Ali Baba. It was so humiliating. I shouted at the soldiers
asking them to help. I told them that under international law they must
keep things under control. They said they were under orders not to
intervene. I was so angry and cried when I saw thieves going off with
hospital beds. That afternoon, two U.S. soldiers could have easily
prevented this happening. But they did not care. They only protected
the Ministry of Oil and the Ministry of the Interior.101

In addition to poor sanitation and lack of adequate health care services,
insufficient access to electricity left Iraqi women vulnerable to both poverty and
gender-based violence. In Iraqi Kurdistan in 2007, the topic of conversation
among women in the local community was not invasion, but electricity.102 At
the time, Iraqi-Kurdish women in this area could expect electricity in their
homes for only four to five hours per day,103 whereas pre-war, the average Iraqi
citizen had sixteen to twenty-four hours of electricity per day.104 One woman in
the community, Jamelia, complained that she no longer could leave the house in
the evening because the streets were so dark and she feared for her safety.105
The lack of electricity also impacted women in the employment sector.106
According to an interview with Um Mustafa, a hairdresser working in Baghdad
in 2005: “[t]here is no electricity, no water, the heat is killing us. Customers,
when they peer in, see only darkness. They shy away, and this is where we are
supposed to make a living. And what’s the quintessential thing for a hairdresser?
Electricity.”107 Insufficient electricity not only made it impossible for women to
continue working in multiple public occupations, but also prohibited older,
98
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educated women from running small businesses out of their homes that began
as a way to earn income during pre-war economic sanctions.108
Therefore, the fallout following the final invasion of the U.S. into the region
left Iraqi women in positions of abject poverty, without stable sources of income
or education.109 For women in the new low-income classes in urban areas or
poor women living in the countryside, education and employment gave way to
simply seeking means for survival.110 Women in communities such as Iraq,
Amman and Damascus began turning to alternative fields of employment to
make enough money to survive: women turned to sex work, female doctors
turned to hairdressing, engineers turned to working in laundromats.111 The Iraqi
military alone employed nearly 430,000 individuals, however, following the
dismantling of the Ba’ath regime and the dissolution of the military, both male
and female employees found themselves unemployed and fighting for
survival.112
Widespread employment, coupled with skyrocketing inflation and poverty,
required families to dismantle the structures that provided for women’s
advancement in the Iraqi economy.113 For example, children were taken out of
schools and put to work to earn a meager additional income, and young girls
were married at earlier ages to lessen financial burdens upon their families.114
Therefore, with unemployment, sky-high inflation, and a virtual collapse of the
economy, the mobile, educated, and employed middle class women of the preinvasion Ba’athist regime have all but disappeared from Iraqi society.115
C. From Disorganized Violence to Organized Targeting: Gender Mobility,
Security and Retaliation
Gender mainstreaming policies via Resolution 1325 failed to address not
only the social vulnerabilities of Iraqi women detailed above, but, initially, also
the lack of a properly functioning police force116 in the destabilized state resulted
in what criminal law scholars Penny Green and Tony Ward characterize as “a
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chaos of opportunistic rape, kidnapping, woman-trafficking and sexual
abuse.”117
In 2003, Human Rights Watch reported that Iraqi gangs were beginning to
form mafia-like organizations, populating the streets of Baghdad and other urban
areas of Iraq.118 In response to the absence of a functioning police force and
increased rates of gendered violence, Iraqi academic and feminist scholar Nicola
Pratt asked a U.S. official about the absence and the responsibility of the U.S. to
intervene.119 She was informed that “‘Iraqi families dealt with violence against
women in their own way–by keeping their women at home. . . . Anyway, I don’t
think women were more targeted than any other group within Iraq.’”120
Yet in spite of U.S. assertions, Iraqi police testified that women and girls
were not only victims of ongoing gang violence, but also unique target of such
gangs who specialized in kidnapping young girls and selling them into sexual
slavery in the Gulf countries.121 According to international women’s human
rights scholar Lisa Davis, the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq created a lucrative
environment for sex and labor trafficking due to ongoing instability, as well as
with a renewed internal displacement of vulnerable minorities.122 While Iraq
passed comprehensive anti-trafficking legislation in April 2012 to protect
victims and prosecute offenders, weak governance and a lack of enforcement
has “nevertheless helped to further entrench Iraq as a regional trafficking
hub.”123
However, seemingly random and opportunistic violence against Iraqi
women and girls in the absence of a local peacekeeping authority did not occur
in a vacuum.124 Davis asserts that conflicts such as the U.S. invasion of Iraq have
not only increased the vulnerability of thousands to gender-based violence, but
“further entrenched structural and cultural violence against women . . . .”125
Therefore, gender-based targeting of Iraqi women occurs as part of a continuum
that reveals patterns of violence that appear arbitrary, but serves clear cultural
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and political purposes.126 While gender mainstreaming failed to account for the
structural, economic, and environmental factors that perpetuated gendered
vulnerability, its push to westernize and modernize Iraqi women also cast them
as symbolic markers of foreign occupation127 and targets for culture-based
gendered retaliation.
Gendered, retaliatory targeting as a by-product of U.S. gender
mainstreaming policies came to the forefront of international consciousness
between 2004 and 2008; when honor killings in Basra, Iraq rose seventy percent
from pre-invasion numbers.128 According to the Basra Security Committee, in
2007 alone, 79 women were killed by vigilantes for violating Islamic teachings,
44 died as a result of honor killings, and seven others were killed for varying
political agendas.129 The United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI)
also received reports of “‘scores of so-called ‘honor crimes’ being perpetrated
regularly in Basra by armed groups or militia.’”130 According to Basra police
records, the forty-four women murdered in “honor killings” had multiple
gunshot wounds, several of which were inflicted execution-style with a single
shot to head.131 Similarly to Dr. Zeena Al- Qushtaini, whose story was related at
the beginning of this Comment, most victims were found on streets or isolated
rural areas by police or members of the public with notes “accusing them of
adultery or of ‘un-Islamic’ conduct, such as failure to follow certain dress codes
or to veil appropriately.”132
Consequently, Iraqi women as symbols of foreign occupation and
westernization were targeted as a means to demarcate boundaries between the
“native citizenry” and the “foreign occupiers.” Iraqi feminist scholar Nadje AlAli proposed that retaliatory violence against women who challenged the
cultural status quo symbolizes not only a visible repudiation of Western modes
of conduct and dress, but an excessive act of excising Western influence from
Iraqi culture.133
Summarizing the above, implementing Resolution 1325 in post-conflict Iraq
to achieve gendered equality and justice had an opposite and inherently
devastating effect on the lives and safety of Iraqi women. Combined with the
126
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apathy directed towards implementation, gender mainstreaming left women
more vulnerable and susceptible to violence because (1) gender mainstreaming
did nothing to resolve the crumbling infrastructure that left women without
electricity, clean water, health care, or employment, (2) as a result of the
crumbling infrastructure, the lack of a peacekeeping police force left women
more vulnerable to kidnapping and sex trafficking, and (3) the push to
mainstream women into positions that were in direct conflict with traditional
gender roles painted Iraqi women as symbols of U.S. occupation and therefore
targets of retaliation.
However, gender mainstreaming through policies such as Resolution 1325
is not the only method through which gendered equality can be constructed or
restored in post-conflict areas. This Comment argues that Vulnerability Theory
better supports policies that would help vulnerable women without exposing
them to gender-based violence. Instead of targeting women as a population
defined by their gender and attempting to restore human rights and gendered
justice through goals of equality, Vulnerability Theory addresses how social,
political, economic, and environmental factors interact with gender to leave
populations of individuals disproportionately vulnerable.134 Therefore, by
addressing how women are embedded within factors that exacerbate
vulnerability rather than treating women as a discrete and discriminated group
on the basis of gender alone, Vulnerability Theory is a more viable policy for
post-conflict, rights-based justice and resolution. To argue in support of
Vulnerability Theory, however, this Comment must first provide a theoretical
overview.
IV. VULNERABILITY THEORY REPLACING LIBERAL GENDER MAINSTREAMING
A. Overview of Vulnerability Theory
First advanced by feminist legal scholar Martha Fineman in the Yale Journal
of Law and Feminism in 2008,135 Vulnerability Theory posits that all human
beings are vulnerable and prone to dependency; therefore, the state has an
obligation to ameliorate that vulnerability.136 Implicit in this theory is the
assertion that “it is neither just nor reasonable to expect that mere equal

134
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treatment will meet individuals’ needs in a world in which no one is assured of
avoiding injury, illness, or other adverse life events.”137
Fineman developed the Vulnerability Theory as a critique of theories of
social justice and responsibility that focus on achieving formal equality through
sameness of treatment.138 Fineman rejects formal equality approaches such as
gender mainstreaming policies, because such approaches focus on eliminating
discrimination against historically disadvantaged groups rather than eliminating
the institutional and structural systems of inequity that create ongoing
discrimination.139 In essence, the gender mainstreaming model is equivalent to
attempting to eradicate weeds by pulling off the leaves, instead of pulling out
the roots. The leaves wither and die for a time, but the roots remain very much
still alive. Therefore, Fineman warns that by treating the symptom rather than
the cause of persistent inequity, formal equality approaches such as Resolution
1325 only serve to further systems of discrimination by facilitating existing
inequalities within a society.140
Vulnerability Theory also advances substantive equality in ways that
identity-based approaches through formal equality theories cannot. Fineman’s
theory of vulnerability rejects formal equality theory because such approaches
oversimplify identity groups into simplistic categories such as race or gender.141
Specifically, Fineman argues that the creation of legal structures that are
sensitive to differing circumstances and positions, as well as to how differing
institutions impact and perpetuate discrimination, cannot be achieved through
focus on “multiplicities of identities, but . . . in exactly the opposite direction:
away from the fragmentation of the legal subject to the creation of a vigorous
universal conception.”142 In order to illustrate Vulnerability Theory’s rejections
137
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broad social policies that provide all individuals with an equitable standard of living and opportunities are
desirable in current political climates, such policies are almost always both over- and under-inclusive. Id.
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of gender mainstreaming attempts at justice, this Comment will apply two base
aspects of Vulnerability Theory: (A) the Restrained v. the Responsive State and
(B) the Embedded v. the Embodied Legal Subject.
B. The Restrained v. The Responsive State
An essential aspect of Vulnerability Theory is the rejection of the
“Restrained State“ in favor of what Martha Fineman labels, “the Responsive
State.”143 In contrast to the Responsive State, the Restrained State avoids
assuming responsibility for inequalities and unwarranted privileges because its
position as the ultimate societal authority is ideologically contained.144 This
constraint is created when individuals, institutions, and the state itself are viewed
as isolated and separated from one another, rather than conceptualized in a state
of interdependence.145 By viewing these entities in isolation, this perspective
limits the ability of the state to regulate, modify and structure institutions in ways
that more effectively respond to vulnerability.146
In contrast, the Responsive State accepts responsibility for its operation and
the societal institutions that it has helped bring into existence, and therefore
views individuals and institutions as intertwined, symbiotic, and
interdependent.147 The Responsive State, under Vulnerability Theory,
subsequently responds to the needs of its population “by creating legal
institutions and systems that increase resilience across populations.”148 For
example, rather than creating a new category of crime for those who commit
fraud against the elderly, Vulnerability Theory would address the deeper sources
of discrimination against the elderly that would leave them vulnerable to
fraudulent scams, such as “social isolation, limited financial literacy, underregulation of commercial activities, under-enforcement of existing regulations
on commercial activities, and lack of access to legal resources for victims of
fraud.”149 By targeting financial, social, and political factors that
disproportionately impact a group and leave them vulnerable, Vulnerability
Theory imagines that society is integrated, rather than comprised of separate
spheres and competing individual identities or groups that structure political and
However, Vulnerability Theory does have prescriptive value as a helpful framework for considering social
structures and how to allocate responsibilities within the state.
143
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institutional practices.150 Therefore, this theory treats equality as a form of
justice anchored in the human condition, rather than in an unachievable ideal of
universal equality.151
C. The Embodied v. The Embedded Legal Subject
By turning towards the examination of justice grounded in unique human
experiences of vulnerability, Vulnerability Theory asserts that any measures that
are designed to achieve justice by simply applying the law to all individuals
equally will not be effective. Such an approach treats vulnerable groups as
embodied legal subjects.152 In the embodied subject, differences are viewed as
the result of politically significant social relations and conventions based on
created categories such as gender and race.153 However, Vulnerability Theory
seeks to look past treating instances of discrimination within isolated and
discrete identities such as gender to examine the embedded legal subject.154 The
embedded legal subject is therefore not one whose identity and subsequent
discrimination is categorized, but instead one that is firmly rooted in society and
its institutions, and the subject’s experiences are woven distinctly into a web of
economic, cultural, political, and social relationships.155 These relationships
structure options, and create or impede opportunities depending on the
individual’s relationship to the institution, not on the individual subject’s
category in the institution.156
D. The Necessity of the Responsive State and Embedded Subject in PostConflict Resolution
In the context of post-conflict resolution, the Restrained State’s methods of
viewing groups and institutions as embodied and isolated rather than embedded
and interacting are counter-productive to the amelioration of social, political,
and economic injustices suffered by vulnerable groups. Consequently, according
150
Beyond Identities, supra note 140, at 1755–56. Therefore, how institutions respond to collective
vulnerability should form the basis on which they are judged and incorporated into social rebuilding and
remaking. Instead, Vulnerability Theory brings “individuals into families, families into communities, and
communities into societies, nation states and international organizations.” Id. at 1756. Hence, individuals
influence relationships and institutions, relationships in turn influence individuals and institutions, and
institutions therefore influence individuals and relationships.
151
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to urban studies legal scholar Yosef Jabareen, viewing institutions as interrelated
rather than independent is essential for post-conflict reconstruction.157 This
perspective should include a holistic approach, taking into account the
interrelated nature of four essential components: political reconstruction,
economic reconstruction, social reconstruction, and provisions for general
security.158
Political reconstruction results in small-scale capacity building, which aims
to strengthen local government so it may support and promote broader political
policies.159 Economic reconstruction subsequently results in promoting a selfsustaining economy that has the capacity to restore vital urban infrastructure,
including access to basic human needs such as clean water, sanitation, and health
services.160 By promoting social reconstruction, nations are rebuilding essential
infrastructure that can support and encourage collective decision-making to
ultimately contribute to enhancing community welfare.161 Finally, security is a
critical precondition for large scale reconstruction of a safe and well-functioning
national infrastructure.162
Layered on top of the Responsive State’s need to view these institutions as
interrelated in post-conflict resolution is the need for the state to examine how
vulnerable communities such as women are embedded in, and made more
vulnerable, by the impact of conflict upon these institutions. For example,
according to gender and women’s rights scholars Elaine Zuckerman and Marcia
Greenberg, examining how post-conflict child-care and familial responsibilities
prevent women from leaving the home could better inform the measures taken
to ensure women can participate in education and employment training
opportunities following an armed conflict.163 In turn, generating employment
serves as a top priority for constructing a sustainable post-conflict economy,
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which is essential because “high unemployment may trigger renewed
conflict.”164
Additionally, examining how resources, like water supply and sanitation, are
basic needs for humanity and survival reveals how the lack of such resources
disproportionately impact women in conflict-damaged countries.165 Besides
putting women and girls at risk of severe health crises, lack of clean water also
requires women to travel over long distances to seek such resources, stealing
valuable time from education and employment.166 Therefore, by being sensitive
not only to the interconnected nature of infrastructural institutions, but also to
how conflict ravages these institutions, the Responsive State highlights and
addresses how these conditions leave groups such as women disproportionately
more vulnerable to discrimination and violence.167
CONCLUSION: SHIFTING FROM GENDER MAINSTREAMING TO VULNERABILITY
THEORY IN POST-CONFLICT IRAQ
To conclude, gender mainstreaming was an inappropriately applied attempt
to achieve gendered justice for Iraqi women that ultimately resulted in rendering
them extraordinarily more susceptible to perpetuating vulnerability and genderbased violence. As demonstrated by the creation of the Iraqi National Action
Plan, the U.S. effort to ameliorate and achieve gendered justice casts Iraqi
women as embodied legal subjects made vulnerable exclusively due to their
gender. Therefore, the apathetically applied NAP sought to achieve equality by
“add[ing] women and stir[ring]” them in to positions of power and autonomy168
without taking into account other social, political or economic factors
contributing and perpetuating post-conflict vulnerability.169 By doing so,
political gender mainstreaming not only failed to reach successful
implementation, but the aims and strategies of such mainstreaming resulted in
making Iraqi women extraordinarily more vulnerable two-fold: gender
mainstreaming both overlooked the necessity expressed in Vulnerability Theory
to address how destabilized social, political and economic infrastructures
interact and contribute to vulnerability, and how westernizing and modernizing
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rhetoric surrounding Iraqi women made them targets for both disorganized
violence and organized, symbolic retaliation against occupation.
As demonstrated by Yosef Jabareen’s four components of post-conflict
reconstruction, gender mainstreaming as a policy of the Restrained State in Iraq
was not viable as a means of achieving gendered justice because it attempted to
address manifesting symptoms of discrimination, rather than examining how
infrastructural crises perpetuated and exacerbated a woman’s vulnerability to
discrimination and violence. Therefore, conditions such as lack of electricity,
clean drinking water, health care services, employment opportunities, and local
safety for Iraqi women were never examined as contributing causes of gendered
vulnerability. Such conditions left Iraqi women disproportionately susceptible
to abject poverty, unemployment, disease, and death.
Additionally, by simply attempting to achieve gendered justice by injecting
women into social, political, and economic positions of power, the U.S. failed
to acknowledge how subverting traditional gender roles during a period of
occupation would make many Iraqi women targets for organized, retaliatory
violence against “westernization.” As demonstrated by the brutal honor-based
killings of scores of women in Basra, Iraq, attempts to ameliorate existing
vulnerabilities of Iraqi women only resulted in further exposing them to genderbased violence.
Therefore, gender mainstreaming in the context of post-conflict Iraq is the
very antithesis of the U.S. intent to achieve gendered justice. Instead,
Vulnerability Theory provides an alternative method to achieving gendered
justice by providing necessary social, political, and economic support for Iraqi
women without exposing them to gender-based violence. The weakness inherent
in gender mainstreaming is its top-down approach: gender mainstreaming in the
restrictive state casts women as embodied subjects made vulnerable by their
gender, thereby attempting to “solve” discrimination through efforts directed
towards achieving gender equality. Conversely, Vulnerability Theory begins
with a bottom-up approach: the Responsive State sees disproportionate
discrimination experienced by women but works to address the root causes of
such discrimination, understanding that factors such as poverty, diminished
access to life-saving resources, unemployment, and violence all intersect with
gender to perpetuate conditions of vulnerability.
Thus, in order to enact meaningful and lasting gendered justice in postconflict Iraq, the U.S. must turn its focus away from gender mainstreaming and
towards the structural support and rebuilding policies of Vulnerability Theory
so that further attempts to achieve justice for Iraqi women do not result in placing
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a Band-Aid® on surface level discrimination while inflicting deeper, more
deadly wounds to their rights and dignities.
EPILOGUE
This Comment would be remiss not to acknowledge that proposing
Vulnerability Theory in order to combat the gender mainstreaming policies of
Resolution 1325 would be moot in the current political condition of Iraq under
the control of militants united under the newly proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria (ISIS). Although U.S. forces worked to implement Resolution 1325 in
the Iraqi state, execution of the Resolution halted with the invasion of Northern
Iraq by ISIS beginning in June 2014.170 According to Lisa Davis, ISIS invaded
Iraq via the exploitation of pre-existing political, economic, and social
destabilization, and during such times of conflict, women, girls, and other
marginalized persons are at greater risk of gender-specific harms, as “preexisting impunity and social stigma surrounding gender-based violence worsens
armed conflict’s impacts.”171 Iraqi women experienced horrific honor-based
violence at the hands of ISIS militants including “execution, dismemberment,
rape, sexual slavery, and flogging.”172
However, hope seemingly dawned for Iraqi women in February 2018, as Iraq
declared victory over ISIS after more than three years of grueling combat against
the extremists fought with close U.S. support.173 Initially, the U.S. military
intervention against ISIS was “described as ‘limited,’ but as Iraq’s military
struggled to roll back the extremists, the U.S.-led coalition’s footprint in the
country steadily grew.”174 Consequently, according to coalition spokesman
Army Colonel Ryan Dillon, while the U.S.-led coalition and the Iraqi
government have agreed to reduce the number of U.S. troops in Iraq,
“[c]ontinued coalition presence in Iraq will be conditions-based, proportional to
the need and in coordination with the government of Iraq.”175
Therefore, as international relations, security studies, and American foreign
policy historian Andrew Bacevich warns, the hope that “the ongoing enterprise
170
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may someday end—that U.S. troops will finally depart—appears so unlikely as
to make the prospect unworthy of discussion. Like the war on drugs or the war
on poverty, the War for the Greater Middle East has become a permanent fixture
in American life and is accepted as such.”176 Although damaging gender
mainstreaming attempts at gendered justice were derailed by the invasion of ISIS
forces in 2014, the U.S. remains a fixed presence in Iraq and in the greater
Middle East. As such, the U.S. is primed and capable to ultimately hurt or help
vulnerable communities ravaged by war.
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